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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, a Second Circuit panel heard a case that involved atrocities
committed in the Sudan. The panel “assume[d], without deciding, that
corporations . . . may be held liable for violations of customary
international law,” under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).1 The ATS
provides, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.”2 Under the ATS, victims of
human rights abuses could sue private tortfeasors in U.S. federal courts,
regardless of who committed the abuses or where the abuses occurred.
One year later, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.3 came before
the same three-judge panel in the Second Circuit on an interlocutory
1 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.,
582 F.3d 244, 261 n.12 (2d Cir. 2009).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
3 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert granted, 132 S.Ct. 472 (2011).
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appeal. A majority of the panel declared that it would not be bound by
its prior assumption,4 and held that a transnational corporation could not
be liable for violations of the law of nations because the law of nations
has customarily imposed liability only upon States and natural persons,
and it has declined to extend liability to corporate entities.5
Judge José Cabranes wrote the Kiobel majority opinion, which was
joined by Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs. The majority reasoned that
customary international law defines those who are subject to human
rights norms and establishes who can be liable for violating those norms.
Since no corporation has ever been liable for human rights torts in an
international tribunal, these corporate defendants could not have
committed a “violation.” Without a violation of the law of nations, the
ATS could not provide the court with subject matter jurisdiction. The
third member of the appellate panel passionately opposed this
construction of the word “violation.” Senior Judge Pierre Leval
nevertheless concurred in the judgment, dismissing the case on the
grounds that the plaintiffs’ claim was not well-pleaded.
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to resolve two
questions arising from Kiobel: (1) whether the issue of corporate civil
tort liability under the ATS is a question of merits or of subject matter
jurisdiction, and (2) “[w]hether corporations are immune from tort
liability for violations of the law of nations such as torture, extrajudicial
executions or genocide[.]”6 This article addresses not only these specific
issues, but also explores the highly relevant canons of statutory
interpretation, norms of international law, and the facts, evidence, and
circumstances surrounding the Kiobel decision that will likely remain
untouched by the Supreme Court. There is a parable that aptly illustrates
the situation:
An Associate Justice of the Supreme Court was sitting by a river
when a Traveler approached and said:
“I wish to cross. Will it be lawful to use this boat?”
“It will,” was the reply; “it is my boat.”
The Traveler thanked him, and pushing the boat into the water
embarked and rowed away. But the boat sank and he was
drowned.

4

See id. at 118–20.
Id.
6 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S.Ct. 472 (2011); Lyle Denniston,
Court
to
Rule
on
Suing
Corporations
and
PLO,
SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=129758.
5
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“Heartless man!” said an Indignant Spectator. Why did you not
tell him that your boat had a hole in it?”
“The matter of the boat’s condition,” said the great jurist, “was
not brought before me.”7

This article advances the position of the Kiobel minority one step
further to argue that the majority’s interpretation of the ATS rests upon
fundamentally unsound principles of statutory construction. Neither
federal law nor international law exempts corporations from observance
of universally accepted human rights laws. I argue here that the Kiobel
majority erred, and the Supreme Court should reverse the Second
Circuit’s decision.
Part II of this article explains the importance and novelty of the
Kiobel decision and examines both the majority and minority opinions in
detail. Part III argues that the majority’s reasoning is based upon an
unsound construction of the ATS. My interpretation of the statute
comprises four main arguments.
First, the statute itself does not limit the breadth of the ATS. While
it requires that plaintiffs be aliens—and even a corporate entity can be an
ATS plaintiff—there is no limitation on defendants. And plain meaning
should be decisive. Furthermore, a fair construction of the statute around
the time of its original enactment would have been likely to conclude that
the statute allows suits against corporations.
Second, the interaction of the ATS with other federal laws indicates
that a limitation on corporate liability, if one is to be found, must arise
under federal, not international law. To limit the breadth of the ATS,
either Congress must pass subsequent limiting legislation or courts must
give it a limiting construction. Congress has limited one class of ATS
defendants: an ATS lawsuit may not proceed against a foreign sovereign.
It has not limited such lawsuits against corporations.
Third, the Supreme Court’s clarification of the statute in 2004
introduced even more ambiguities, principally the nature of an
international “norm” and whether the distinction between natural and
juridical persons is “related” to subject matter jurisdiction. The Kiobel
majority felt “required” by the 2004 decision to search international law
sources to establish a custom of corporate liability as a prerequisite for
subject matter jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court does not, in
fact, require this inquiry.

7 Ambrose Bierce, A Defective Petition, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF AMBROSE
BIERCE, vol. VI 294 (1911), available at http://books.google.com/ebooks?id=EnpKAAA
AYAAJ at 280.
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Fourth—a more creative approach to statutory construction—the
ATS, though first codified in 1789, was essentially reauthorized by
Congress in 1991. The Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”), passed
alongside the ATS, should be relevant to any construction of the older
statute. In pari materia analysis of the TVPA gives the ATS a new
meaning and purpose. The TVPA does not, however, clarify the
corporate liability issue because however the statute is construed—to
either allow or exempt corporate defendants—the construction must be
based to some degree in absurdity.
Part IV asserts that the Kiobel majority has improperly imported
norms of personal jurisdiction from international criminal tribunals into
ATS subject matter jurisdiction requirements.
The majority’s
interpretation requires in essence an international cause of action. This
holding erroneously departs from the established method of creating a
cause of action using different strands of common law and improperly
elevates international law above federal law.
The minority’s
consideration of this issue as one of remedy is closer to the mark, but it
makes the same mistake of importing a procedural rule without adequate
support.
Part V demonstrates that even if the Kiobel majority is correct in
interpreting the ATS to require an international custom of enforcing
human rights law against corporations, it ignored evidence that would
support such a custom. Contrary to the majority’s holding, international
law does consider corporate actors to be subject to human rights norms,
and it has enforced those norms against a corporation. Additionally, the
majority’s review of international law sources is incomplete, and the
rapid development of this area of international law casts further doubt on
the majority’s conclusion. Kiobel should be decided in light of the
environment it affects: an increasingly globalized world in which
transnational corporations often hold more economic power than many
States.
II. IS KIOBEL AN OUTLIER, OR THE END OF CORPORATE LIABILITY?
Human rights abuses were committed in the Niger Delta from
1993–1995. The Kiobel plaintiffs claimed that Royal Dutch/Shell and its
corporate subsidiaries aided and abetted the commission of those abuses.
The plaintiffs sued in the Southern District of New York, alleging that
Shell provided transportation, food and compensation to ultraviolent
Nigerian soldiers, and that Shell had a hand in the sham trials and death
sentences of nine Ogoni protesters, including Dr. Barinem Kiobel and
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Ken Saro-Wiwa.8 A U.S. federal court could not determine whether
Shell bore any responsibility for those abuses unless it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the cause of action. This article, therefore,
discusses the facts of this fascinating case only insofar as they are
relevant to ATS jurisdiction.
The Kiobel action, like other ATS cases over the past 15 years,
sought to litigate notorious injustices. One business commentator noted
the proliferation of ATS litigation against companies “doing business in
conflict-torn regions [and] . . . . countries with poor human rights records
or oppressive governments . . . .”9 Many of the defendants have been
involved in “extractive industries . . . such as ExxonMobil in Indonesia,
Occidental in Colombia, Talisman in Sudan, Shell in Nigeria, Unocal in
Burma, and Rio Tinto in Papua New Guinea.”10 Other ATS suits have
alleged that Pfizer conducted medical experiments on Nigerian children
without consent, and that Nestle used child labor to work cocoa
plantations in the Ivory Coast.11 Even al-Qaeda, a vague entity with no
definable corporate headquarters, has been sued under the ATS.12
In Saleh v. Titan, 250 Iraqis brought suit against American
contractors CACI International and Titan Industries (now dba L-3
Services), alleging violations of human rights in Abu Ghraib prison and
other detention facilities.13 The last of these generated political backlash
against the ATS in general, but it illustrates a significant goal of ATS
plaintiffs: to expose human rights violations by trying them in the court
of public opinion.
The dismissal of the case against Shell in 2010 by the divided
Second Circuit panel made headlines, and the sweep of the ruling gained
8 Pleadings and other court documents for the Wiwa/Kiobel case are available at
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/12/065.html.
Several
plaintiffs,
including Wiwa’s son, settled with Shell in 2009. Jad Mouwad, Shell to Pay $15.5
Million to Settle Nigerian Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2009, at B1. Kiobel’s widow is now
the lead plaintiff.
9 John B. Bellinger, Will Federal Court’s Kiobel Ruling End Second Wave of Alien
Tort Statute Suits?, 25 WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION No. 34, 2 (Nov. 12, 2010),
available
at
http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/11-1210Bellinger_LegalBackgrounder.pdf (citations omitted).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 784 n.16, 785
n.19, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (allowing ATS claims to proceed against al Qaeda and two
alleged “fronts” for that “organization”).
13 Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Juli Schwartz, Saleh v. Titan
Corporation: The Alien Tort Claims Act: More Bark Than Bite? Procedural Limitations
and the Future of ATCA Litigation Against Corporate Contractors, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 867
(2006); see also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va.
2009).
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immediate attention.14 It was the first appellate15 decision to hold that
the ATS could not be used against corporations.16 The position taken by
the majority appeared to gain steady ground in lower courts since the
decision was issued in September 2010.17 An Indiana district court, for
example, dismissed an ATS claim against a corporation, solely on the
persuasiveness of Kiobel.18 One week later, the same court disposed of a
similar case, this time on the merits rather than for want of jurisdiction.19
Within the Second Circuit, one post-Kiobel dismissal did not even
generate a written opinion.20 Elsewhere, plaintiffs’ attorneys attempted
to control the fallout.21
Meanwhile, attorneys for Esther Kiobel petitioned the panel for a
rehearing en banc, which was denied; the remaining active judges of the
Second Circuit voted 5–5 to rehear Kiobel, which had the effect of
denying a rehearing.22
Several months later, the Eleventh Circuit allowed an ATS suit
against a corporate defendant to proceed, creating a circuit split.23
Shortly after the Kiobel plaintiffs filed their Petition for Certiorari,24 the
Seventh Circuit also split with the Kiobel majority on the question of

14 Bob Van Voris and Patricia Hurtado, Nigeria Torture Case Decision Exempts
Companies From U.S. Alien Tort Law (Sep. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-17/u-s-corporations-aren-t-subject-to-alientort-law-appeals-court-rules.html.
15 A district court in California reached this same conclusion one week before the
Kiobel decision was filed. See Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1132–45 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (the practice of forced child labor in cocoa fields in Mali was not actionable
because of defendant’s corporate nature).
16 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 151 note * (2d Cir. 2010)
(Leval, J, concurring).
17 E.g., Viera v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 09-495, 2010 WL 3893791 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30,
2010); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Flomo v.
Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 744 F. Supp. 2d 810 (S.D. Ind. 2010).
18 Viera, 2010 WL 3893791 at *2.
19 Flomo, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 817.
20 Mastafa, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 298–301 (noting that ATS claims were dismissed in
open court).
21 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Doe v.
Drummond Co., Inc., No. 7:09-cv-1041, 2010 WL 4036147, at *41–*42 (N.D. Ala. Oct.
12, 2010) (arguing Kiobel should not be persuasive authority).
22 Kiobel, 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011); reh’g, en banc, denied, 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir.
2011).
23 Baloco v. Drummond Co., Inc., 631 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2011); Romero v.
Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Julian G. Ku, The
Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of
Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 367–68 (2011) (reporting the Eleventh
Circuit’s lack of analysis on the issue).
24 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert granted,
132 S.Ct. 472 (2011).
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corporate liability.25 A divided D.C. Circuit has since departed from
Kiobel as well, although it denied that corporations may be liable under
the TVPA.26 In October, 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
hear Kiobel alongside Mohamad v. Rajoub.27
The majority’s ruling in Kiobel raised numerous policy questions
that extend beyond the narrow issues to be addressed by the Supreme
Court. If federal courts do not have jurisdiction over alien tort claims
against corporations, what becomes of the actions against corporate
entities that were fully litigated before this ruling? In one trial, a jury
found a corporation liable for violations of international law and awarded
compensatory and punitive damages.28 In another case, an $80 million
default judgment was entered against a corporate defendant for forced
labor violations.29 Other ATS litigation has resulted in outcomes
favorable to defendants, one notable example being a jury’s unanimous
verdict that Chevron was not responsible for violence against protesters
who had taken over an oil platform.30 If the court had no power to hear
the case, any verdict would be invalid—would res judicata prevent the
plaintiffs from suing Chevron elsewhere? If Kiobel is affirmed by the
Supreme Court, could the damage awards be retroactively dissolved
because the courts actually had no power to hear the cases?31 The
Second Circuit does not address these questions.
The remainder of Part I explains the fundamental disagreement
between the majority and concurring opinions. Both assert the need to
assess possible violations of the law of nations by consulting
international law. To determine whether a plaintiff has pleaded a
“violation of the law of nations,” Judge Leval’s concurring opinion
would ask whether an international criminal tribunal could punish the
25

Flomo v. Firestone, 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011).
See part III.C, infra; Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F.3d 604 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
27 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S.Ct. 472 (2011); Lyle Denniston,
Court
to
Rule
on
Suing
Corporations
and
PLO,
SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=129758.
28 Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., 588 F. Supp. 2d 375 (E.D.N.Y.
2008). The verdict the following year awarded $1.75 million to plaintiffs. See More Law
Lexapedia,
www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n=1:08-cv-01659-BMC&s=NY&d=
40919 (case summary noting verdicts).
29 Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2008) ($80 million
verdict for plaintiffs who endured forced labor).
30 Bowoto v. Chevron, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004); see also Romero v.
Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008) (verdict absolved defendants of
responsibility for deaths).
31 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4–6) (allowing relief from a judgment that is void, or that
was based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed and vacated, but only if the
motion is filed “within a reasonable time” 60(c)).
26
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conduct alleged here.”32 The majority, by contrast, asks whether an
international criminal tribunal could punish this defendant for the
conduct alleged here.33
A disconnect within the judicial panel is apparent. Judge Leval
described the majority’s logic as “internally inconsistent.”34 Though
Judge Leval’s conclusion seems correct, he fails to understand how the
majority reached its conclusions. This section endeavors to understand
the majority’s reasoning by probing the unexpressed assumptions that
underlie its logic. Because Judge Leval’s worldview is apparent
throughout, there is no similar need to plumb subtext in the concurring
opinion.
A. The Kiobel Majority
1. Substance of the Opinion
Judge Cabranes begins by observing that while the ATS places a
limitation on plaintiffs, it is silent regarding defendants.35 Because the
statute does not indicate who can violate the law of nations, the first issue
facing the majority is which law should fill that gap, international or
federal law?36
The majority’s ATS analysis here follows the guidelines laid out in
the landmark Supreme Court decision Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.37 In
2004, the Supreme Court heard an ATS claim that was brought against a
natural person acting under the authority of the United States.38 Justice
Souter mentioned the issue of corporate liability in a footnote, to which
the Kiobel majority turned for direction: “In Sosa the Supreme Court
instructed the lower federal courts to consider ‘whether international law
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a
corporation or individual.’”39 If international law does not provide
liability against a given actor, it cannot be alleged that the actor has
committed the tort in violation of the law of nations, so the plaintiffs
have failed to establish an element necessary for jurisdiction. In Kiobel,
32 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149–51 (2d Cir. 2010)
(Leval, J., concurring).
33 Id.
34 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 152, 153, 174 (Leval, J., concurring).
35 Id. at 150 (Leval, J., concurring).
36 Id. at 122, 125.
37 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
38 Id.
39 Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111, 126 (quoting and adding emphasis to Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004)).
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the plaintiffs alleged that Shell had aided and abetted human rights
abuses.40 Applying Souter’s instruction, the majority asked whether
international law had identified non-State entities that may be held
responsible for committing that act.41 The court concluded that aiding
and abetting is indeed within the scope of liability in international law.42
To determine whether to address corporate liability before conduct,
the majority drew support from Judge Katzmann’s concurring opinion in
Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd,43 a Second Circuit decision
that followed Sosa and established civil liability for aiding and abetting
the violation of an international law norm.44 “[T]o assure itself that it has
jurisdiction to hear a claim under the [ATS],” Katzmann wrote, “[a
court] should first determine whether the alleged tort was in fact
‘committed in violation of the law of nations,’ . . . and whether this law
would recognize the defendants’ responsibility for that violation.”45
Katzmann noted that although domestic law carried a presumption
against aiding and abetting liability, international law did extend liability
to non-State actors who aided and abetted violations of the law of
nations.46 Liability on the theory of aiding and abetting was generally
recognized by international law, so a jurisdictional claim could be upheld
on that basis.47
The majority reasoned that corporate liability is like aiding and
abetting liability in that it is not itself a violation, but rather a norm that
seeks to identify those responsible for the underlying offense.48 “It is
inconceivable that a defendant who is not liable under customary
international law could be liable under the ATS.”49 Thus, international
law must assign liability to an aiding and abetting corporation before the
ATS will do so.
The majority points out that this principle has long been the law in
other ATS cases as well.50 For example, the Nuremberg tribunals
established individual criminal liability for individuals acting under color
of State law. Under this rule, Palestinian attackers could not be held
liable for bombing a busload of Israelis in a 1984 ATS case, in part
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117.
Id. at 125.
See id. at 129–30.
504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).
Kiobel, 621 F.3d. at 129.
Id. (quoting Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 270) (alteration in original).
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 129–30 (citing Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 270).
Id.
Id. at 129–30.
Id. at 122 (emphasis added).
Id. at 128.

2011] CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TORTS

53

because the Palestinian Liberation Organization was not a recognized
State, and in part because liability for “individuals acting separate from
any State’s authority or direction” was “less established.”51 That is to
say, the nature of the defendant served to bar the suit. Ten years later,
however, the Second Circuit acknowledged that customary international
law had evolved when it found that Radovan Karadžić could be held
liable for crimes against humanity committed while he was president of
Srpska, another quasi-State.52 The court stated, “[w]e have looked to
international law to determine whether State officials, private
individuals, and aiders and abettors, can be held liable under the ATS.
There is no principled basis for treating the question of corporate liability
differently.”53
Next, the Kiobel majority turned to traditional sources of customary
international law to determine whether States had established a
consistent practice of holding corporations liable for human rights
violations and whether a sense of legal obligation impelled them to do
so.54 The majority notes that international law identifies who may be
held responsible for violating its norms. Since the Nuremberg tribunals,
“international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well
as upon states.”55 Although liability is well established for living,
breathing aiders and abettors, it is not established for corporations. In
fact, the London charter that established the tribunals provided
jurisdiction exclusively over natural persons.56 While the International
Military Tribunal did have the authority to indict criminal organizations,
a declaration that a defendant was part of a criminal organization “did
not result in the organization being punished or having liability assessed
against it. Rather, the effect of declaring an organization criminal was
merely to facilitate the prosecution of individuals who were members of
the organization.”57
The majority noted in particular that several executives of I.G.
Farben, a corporation that was thoroughly complicit in Nazi atrocities,
were tried for war crimes.58 However, the military tribunals at
51 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied 470 U.S. 103 (1985); see also Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128.
52 Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239–41 (2d Cir. 1995).
53 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 130 (internal citations omitted).
54 Id. at 132 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102(2) and ICJ Statute, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 art. 38 (1945)).
55 The Nuremberg Trial (United States v. Goering), 6 F.R.D. 69, 119 (Int’l Mil. Trib.
at Nuremberg, 1946), quoted in Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 127.
56 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 133–34.
57 Id. at 134.
58 Id.

54

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 8:43

Nuremberg did not indict Farben itself.59 Why not prosecute the entity
responsible for Auschwitz? The majority seizes on the trial’s most
memorable passage: “Crimes against international law are committed by
men, not by abstract entities [i.e. States], and only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international
law be enforced.”60 Thus, in 1948, individual liability was a recognized
norm of international law, and corporate liability was not.
The Kiobel court then asked whether international law has evolved
since then to enforce norms of corporate responsibility. The majority
answered in the negative, holding that subsequent international criminal
tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda reached the same conclusion as the
tribunal at Nuremberg.61 So too has the International Criminal Court,
established by the Rome Statute in 1998.62 Additionally, the majority
notes that international tribunals do not have jurisdiction to impose civil
liability on any private actor.63
In addition to international tribunals, the majority also considered
other sources of international law: treaties and the writings of
publicists.64 While some treaties, such as the Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, provide for corporate liability, the majority found that they
are limited to their specific subject areas. The Kiobel majority concluded
that no treaty explicitly provides private causes of action for international
human rights violations that extend liability to corporations.65
Although scholars and jurists have addressed the idea of corporate
criminal liability66 and international corporate obligations,67 they fail to
provide evidence that liability for corporations is customarily enforced
by international law today. “Tellingly, most proponents of corporate
liability under customary international law discuss the subject as merely
a possibility or a goal, rather than an established norm of customary
59

Id.
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 135, citing The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. at 110.
61 Id. at 136.
62 Id. at 136–37.
63 Id. at 137.
64 Id. at 137–45.
65 Id. at 141.
66 E.g., José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9
SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1(2011); Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under
International Criminal Law Over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on
an International Criminal Court, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 139 (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
67 E.g., David D. Christensen, Corporate Liability for Overseas Human Rights
Abuses: The Alien Tort Statute After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV
1219, 1235 (2005).
60
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international law,” the majority asserts.68 The majority opinion includes
citations to notable proponents of human rights enforcement, including
Menno Kamminga, Steven Ratner, Beth Stevens, and Paul Hoffman (the
last of whom was the lead advocate for the Kiobel plaintiffs.69 Hoffman
also represented Humberto Álvarez-Machaín in 2004, and he argued the
appeals at the Seventh and D.C. Circuits in 2011).70 These scholars were
consulted to provide “trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.”71
Their writings, far from adducing evidence to show the actual practice of
corporate liability at the international level, in fact indicate that such
liability is aspirational in nature.72
Judge Cabranes, writing for the majority in Kiobel, indicates that
the absence of an international legal norm extending the scope of liability
to corporations must be dispositive.73 At present, corporate entities
(“juridical persons”) cannot be regarded as subjects of international law
with duties to abide by human rights norms. “To permit [federal] courts
to recognize corporate liability under the ATS, however, would require,
at the very least, a different statute—one that goes beyond providing
jurisdiction over torts committed ‘in violation of the law of nations’ to
authorize suits against entities that are not subjects of customary
international law.”74
Moreover, as a matter of policy, the ATS should not be read “to
encourage United States courts to create new norms of customary
international law unilaterally.”75 If a domestic court recognized such a
norm, and it was not universally accepted, the court might “create
friction in our relations with foreign nations and, therefore, would
contravene the international comity the statute was enacted to
promote.”76
For these reasons, the majority held that plaintiffs had not charged a
violation of international law, and dismissed the case for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.
2. The Majority’s Underlying Worldview
The majority decision has a long reach: Kiobel does not merely
stand for the principle that corporations cannot be sued on a tort theory
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 144 n.48.
Id. at 144.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
Kiobel at 143–44 n.47 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734).
Id.
Id. at 191 (Leval, J., concurring).
Id. at 148.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 140–41.
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of aiding and abetting. Rather, it finds that corporate entities cannot
violate customary international law, because they are not subject to it.
The majority’s discourse on subjects of international law indicates a
narrower definition of the word “violation.” A violation is not merely
breaking a rule. Rather, a person or entity is only subject to a rule if he,
she, or it can reasonably expect sanctions for noncompliance.77 This idea
is not well-developed by the majority, but it is rooted in common sense.
“If you want to know the law and nothing else,” Justice Holmes once
said, “you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material
consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a
good one, who finds his reasons for conduct . . . in the vaguer sanctions
of conscience.”78 Holmes explained that the notion of a legal duty is
rooted in the prophecies of what courts will do in fact, not what they
ought to do.79 With custom as its only guidepost, it seems intuitive for
the Kiobel majority to tacitly assume that an unenforced rule is a nullity.
Since corporations have no expectation of being held liable for human
rights violations under international law, it would be unfair to grant a
court power to impose liability upon them.80
The pair of international law principles identified by the majority—
no criminal liability for corporations, and no civil liability for any private
actor—indicates that corporations have no obligations under
international law. They therefore are not subject to that law.
The majority opinion is also an exercise in legal formalism in that it
avoids—and even admonishes—policy considerations that might favor
the plaintiffs. For the majority, strict adherence to established principles
of customary international law is an end in itself. There is no discussion
of the evils addressed by the modern line of Alien Tort Statute
jurisprudence. The discussion of whether ATS litigation enmeshes the
judiciary in foreign relations, which may have been the purpose of Sosa’s
footnote 20, is mentioned only in passing.81 Judge Leval disagreed,
stating, “‘[l]imiting civil liability to individuals while exonerating the
corporation . . . makes little sense in today’s world,’ and ‘[d]efendants
present[ed] no policy reason why corporations should be uniquely
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See Alvarez, supra note 66, at 22–24.
See generally O.W. Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459, 461
(1897).
79 Id.
80 Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011).
81 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 760–63 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (interpreting footnote 20 to mean that comity principles allow universal
criminal jurisdiction for certain egregious behavior, and that universal tort jurisdiction
over that same behavior “would be no more threatening”).
78

2011] CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TORTS

57

exempt from tort liability under the ATS[.]’”82 The majority rejoined,
“[c]ustomary international law . . . is developed through the customs and
practices of States, not by what ‘makes . . . sense’ to a judge, [or] the
‘policy reason[s]’ recognized by a judge.”83
Judge Cabranes, an international law expert, appears to reject the
notion that his decisions on the law of nations make him a participant in
the gradual formation of custom. Instead, his majority opinion takes the
position that international law norms are merely discoverable. The
majority indicates that its Kiobel decision could be reversed if Congress
specifically authorized subject matter jurisdiction for international law
claims against corporate defendants, or if corporate liability ripened into
a specific, universal, obligatory norm of international law.84
B. The Kiobel Minority
While Judge Cabranes treats customary international law as a body
of norms whose practice can be discovered, Judge Leval’s minority
opinion appears to view federal courts as contributors in the gradual
creation and development of international custom and principles.
Because of this worldview, the minority perceives not that the majority
has discovered the absence of a rule of corporate liability, but rather that
the majority has fabricated a positive rule of corporate immunity.85
The majority’s logic, in Judge Leval’s eyes, amounts to a crime
against humanity, and he attacks with quotable panache. “According to
the rule my colleagues have created, one who earns profits by
commercial exploitation of abuse of fundamental human rights can
successfully shield those profits from victims’ claims for compensation
simply by taking the precaution of conducting the heinous operation in
the corporate form.”86 For example, “[m]y colleagues’ new rule offers
secure protection for the profits of piracy so long as the perpetrators take
the precaution to incorporate the business.”87 Nearly two-thirds of Judge
Leval’s opinion is devoted to criticizing the majority’s reasoning and
conclusions.
Judge Leval nevertheless accedes to both of the majority’s most
important propositions. He agrees that “the place to look for answers
82 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 140 (Leval, J., concurring) (quoting In re Agent Orange Prod.
Liability Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 58, 59 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (emphasis added).
83 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 140 n.41 (Leval, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
84 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 153 (Leval, J., concurring).
85 Immunity has been a holy quest for defendants of modern ATS claims since such
claims began. See generally Tom Lininger, Overcoming Immunity Defenses to Human
Rights Suits in U.S. Courts, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 177 (1994).
86 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149–50 (Leval, J., concurring).
87 Id. at 156 (Leval, J., concurring).
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whether any set of facts constitutes a violation of international law is to
international law,” and also that “the rules of international law do not
provide civil liability against any private actor and do not provide any
form of liability [against] corporations.”88 And while the concurrence
does not explicitly challenge the assertion that international law should
provide the scope of liability for ATS cases, the approach is more
nuanced. The concurrence agrees with an interpretation of the ATS by
German attorney and scholar Michael Koebele that “the ATS, although
incorporating international law, is still governed by and forms part of
torts law which applies equally to natural and legal persons unless the
text of a statute provides otherwise.”89 The law of nations in the areas of
human rights and the law of war generally regulates conduct, but it is
generally silent on how such norms may be enforced (universal criminal
jurisdiction is a notable exception). “[International law] leaves the
manner of enforcement, including the question of whether there should
be private civil remedies for violations of law, almost entirely to
individual nations.”90
This theme reverberates through the concurring opinion to
challenge the majority’s next contention: that international criminal law
must extend liability to corporations before the ATS will do so.91 The
minority accepts that international law does not recognize corporate
criminal liability.92 But there is a good reason for this limitation:
criminal liability is generally not appropriate for a corporation. “The
reasons why the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals has been
limited to the prosecution of natural persons, as opposed to juridical
entities, relate to the nature and purposes of criminal punishment, and
have no application to the very different nature and purposes of civil
compensatory liability.”93
Criminal sanctions serve several purposes, the concurrence points
out.94 Society may justly demand retribution to make an offender suffer
for the suffering he caused; incapacitate the offender by incarcerating
him; correct the offender using fear of punishment to dissuade him from
future bad acts; and deter others who may wish to avoid similar

88

Id. at 174, 186 (Leval, J., concurring).
Michael Koebele, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE:
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH U.S. TORTS LAW 208 (2009); see also
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 172 n.30, 181 n.38 (Leval, J., concurring).
90 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 176 (Leval, J., concurring).
91 Id. at 127–31.
92 Id. at 166–67 (Leval, J. concurring).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 166 (Leval, J., concurring).
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punishments.95 However, none of these objectives is reached by
imposing criminal punishments on a corporate entity.96 “A corporation,
having no body, no soul, and no conscience, is incapable of suffering, of
remorse, or of pragmatic reassessment of its future behavior.”97
Corporate criminal liability would be bad policy because it would not
achieve those stated goals.
Furthermore, international organizations rightly refuse to extend
criminal liability to corporations for practical reasons. Mens rea cannot
reasonably be imputed. A corporation cannot be incapacitated by
imprisonment. “[W]hen the time comes to impose punishment for past
misdeeds, the corporation’s owners, directors, and employees may be
completely different persons from those who held the positions at the
time of misconduct [which could] undermine the objectives of criminal
law by misdirecting prosecution away from those deserving of
punishment.”98 The Seventh Circuit later pointed out that “if a crime . . .
is committed or condoned at the managerial or board of directors level of
the corporation, the corporation itself is criminally liable.”99
The minority agreed with the majority’s reasoning that international
crimes are committed by people, not abstract entities, and therefore an
evaluation of the conduct of those entities is not foreclosed.100 “Among
the focuses of the Nuremberg trials was the exploitation of slave labor by
I.G. [Farben] . . . . The tribunal found that Farben’s program of
exploitation of slave labor violated the standards of international law.”101
By emphasizing this nuance, the minority rejects the notion that no
violation has occurred unless criminal liability could result. The action
of exploiting slaves constituted a violation of international law at the
moment it occurred, regardless of who committed the act, or what
liability might attach, or whether an international or national court could
exercise personal jurisdiction over the violator.102 Under the majority’s
formulation, in contrast, “compensatory damages may be awarded under
the ATS against the corporation’s employees, natural persons who acted
in the corporation’s behalf, but not against the corporation that
commanded the atrocities and earned profits by committing them.”103
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Id. at 166–67 (Leval, J., concurring).
Kiobel, 621 F3d at 168 (Leval, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011).
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 168 (Leval, J., concurring).
Id. at 155 (Leval, J., concurring).
Id. at 159 (Leval, J., concurring).
Id. at 151 (Leval, J., concurring).
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Civil liability, in contrast with criminal liability, serves different
ends, the concurrence explains. “A principal objective of civil tort
liability is to compensate victims of illegal conduct for the harms
inflicted on them and to restore to them what is rightfully theirs.”104
These objectives cannot be reached by suing the responsible employees
of a corporation. “Because the corporation, and not its personnel, earned
the principal profit from the violation of the rights of others, the goal of
compensation of the victims likely cannot be achieved if they have
remedies only against the [natural] persons who acted on the
corporation’s behalf, even in the unlikely event that the victims could sue
those persons in a court which grants civil remedies for violations of
international law.”105 Thus, the majority erred by looking primarily to
international criminal law and only briefly to international civil law.
The minority asked instead, how does the law of nations
customarily impose civil liability for violations of its norms?106 Far from
being silent on the issue, international law frequently delegates
responsibility for civil enforcement of its norms. The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, for example, is
“typical” in that it “defines the illegal act of genocide, obligates State
parties to enforce its prohibition, and leaves it to each State to devise its
own system for giving effect to the Convention’s norms.”107
The U.S. is one of those parties, and it has affected such a system.
The courts of the United States have been open to the law of nations
since their founding. The “define and punish” clause of the Constitution
allows U.S. courts to adjudicate crimes committed in violation of the law
of nations, no matter where committed.108 The Alien Tort Statute in a
similar fashion allows universal civil jurisdiction by authorizing U.S.
courts to exercise jurisdiction over torts committed in violation of
international law.109 In both types of cases, jurisdiction rests on the
character of the act, not the personality of the actor.
The concurring opinion also explains why ATS subject matter
jurisdiction in federal courts should not be coextensive with personal
jurisdiction in international criminal tribunals: the tribunals “withhold
104

Id. at 169 (Leval, J., concurring).
Id.
106 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 173–74 (Leval, J., concurring).
107 Id. at 173 (Leval, J., concurring) (discussing the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, arts. I, II, V, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (Dec. 9, 1948)).
108 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10. See e.g., U.S. v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D.
Va. 2010) (upholding charge of piracy off the coast of Somalia); see also Eugene
Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause and the Limits of Universal Jurisdiction,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 150 (2009).
109 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
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criminal liability from juridical entities for reasons that have nothing to
do with whether they violated the conduct norms of international law, but
result only from a perceived inappropriateness of imposing criminal
judgments on artificial entities.”110
Judge Leval makes two points regarding how international civil law
may inform “scope of liability” principles. First, international law
recognizes and assigns civil liability to abstract entities.111 Statehood,
like incorporation, creates an abstract entity with legal personage, and the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) (among others) may award
reparations from one State to another. It is therefore no great leap to
assume that international law supports a theory of liability that
encompasses juridical persons, such as corporations.112 Secondly, human
rights conventions assign the task of enforcing their norms of conduct
against private violators to States, leaving the procedure and rules of
decision to the domestic legal systems.113 Every legal system in the
world extends liability to corporations for torts. The ATS does too. This
pair of principles—international law’s recognition of civil damages
borne by bloodless entities (States), and punishment of private entities by
domestic courts for violations of human rights law—indicates that there
is nothing wrong with entertaining suits that allege corporate liability for
torts committed in violation of the law of nations. There is certainly
nothing to suggest that corporations are not subject to human rights
norms or that they are exempt from observing norms of conduct that
otherwise command universal acceptance.
The Kiobel minority, like the majority, discussed Judge Katzmann’s
exegesis on ATS causes of action.114 To summarize, federal courts
transmute international criminal acts into federal civil wrongs because
the ATS provides justice to human rights victims in a different way than
international criminal law does.115 International criminal tribunals
establish whether there was wrongdoing and proceed to justice by
punishing the (private) wrongdoer.116 The federal courts, by contrast,
establish whether there was wrongdoing using the same international
criteria, but proceed to justice by compensating the victim.117 The
majority understood Katzmann to require that the “law [of nations]
110

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 187 (Leval, J., concurring).
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112 Id. at 170–71 n.24 (Leval, J., concurring).
113 Id. at 169 (Leval, J., concurring).
114 Id. at 186–87 (Leval, J., concurring).
115 Id. (Leval, J., concurring) (citing Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd, 504 F.3d
254, 282 (2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring)).
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would recognize the defendants’ responsibility for that violation,”118 but
the minority fleshes out the principle in greater depth.
Legal classification can be important to whether or not there has
been a “violation,” but only when the distinction is between State and
non-State actors. Katzmann went on to say, “[w]e have repeatedly
treated the issue of whether corporations may be held liable under the
AT[S] as indistinguishable from the question of whether private
individuals may be.”119
When the majority could not find any “norm” of corporate liability
within the law of nations, it made what the minority considered an
enormous and unjustified leap in declaring that corporations are not
subject to the law of nations, and they owe no duty to abide by
(otherwise universal) human rights norms.120 In a string of hypotheticals,
the minority illustrates that the majority’s holding would allow a
corporation to commit heinous atrocities and shield the corporation’s illgotten profits from any legal accountability.121
Despite the spirited disagreement on the question of whether the
ATS allows for corporate liability, Judge Leval nonetheless concurs in
the judgment to dismiss the case for failure to state a proper claim for
secondary liability.122 The Second Circuit in Presbyterian Church of
Sudan found that international law’s standard for aiding and abetting
human rights abuses requires a mens rea showing of purpose to bring
about those abuses.123 Mere knowledge of abuses, even when combined
with material support in fact is not sufficient “to support the inference of
a purpose on the defendant’s part to facilitate human rights abuses.”124
Judge Leval explains by analogy that this standard is appropriate: “The
shoemaker who makes Hitler’s shoes should not be held responsible for
Hitler’s atrocities, even if the shoemaker knows that a pair of shoes will
help Hitler accomplish his horrendous agenda.”125 This complaint did
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Id. at 129–30 n.32.
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 282 (Katzmann, J.), quoted in Kiobel, 621 F.3d at187; see
also Kiobel, reh’g, en banc, denied, 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 2010) (Katzmann, J.,
dissenting) (endorsing the minority’s view of his Khulumani decision).
120 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 153 (Leval, J., concurring).
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122 Id. at 196 (Leval, J., concurring).
123 Id. at 192 (Leval, J., concurring) (citing Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc. 582 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2009)). Accord Aziz v. Alcolac Inc., 658 F.3d
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124 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 193 (Leval, J., concurring).
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not allege specific facts that indicate Shell acted with the requisite
purpose.126
It may be relevant for future ATS cases and scholarship to note that
there appears to be a circuit split on the mens rea requirement for aiding
and abetting, and that this split appears to reflect a division among
sources of international law.127 The Ninth Circuit has a more permissive
standard than the one articulated by the Second Circuit minority. The
Ninth Circuit would hear an aiding and abetting claim if the defendant
gave “knowing practical assistance, encouragement or moral support,
which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”128
III. A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH: THE ATS DOES NOT
FORECLOSE CORPORATE LIABILITY
Contrary to the majority opinion in Kiobel, the ATS does not
“require [the court to] look to international law to determine [its]
jurisdiction over ATS claims against a particular class of defendant, such
as corporations.”129 This section analyzes the ATS, and addresses the
issue of corporate liability within the ATS interpretation.
The first step of statutory construction analysis is uncontroversial:
the plain language of the statute does not exclude any defendant.
Secondly, the legislative history indicates no Congressional intent to
exclude corporate defendants, and the words would not have been
understood to exclude such defendants at the time of its enactment.
Thirdly, another federal statute does enumerate exclusions for foreign
sovereigns from ATS claims. These well-settled exclusions should
inform the more nebulous status of corporate defendants. Fourth, greater
credit should be given to Judge Leval’s assertion that the majority
misread Sosa. Finally, the ATS should be interpreted in pari materia
with its clarifying statute, the Torture Victims Protection Act.
A. The Plain Meaning Does Not Limit the Breadth of ATS Jurisdiction
This section examines the plain meaning of the ATS piece by piece.
Any exercise in statutory construction must begin with the text: “The
126
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See generally, Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights
Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304 (2008).
128 Compare Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 186–88 (Leval, J., concurring) (“purpose” mens rea
requirement) (citing Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, (2d Cir.
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129 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 172 n.30.
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district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”130 The sentence comprises a broadly worded
enacting clause restricted by provisos. The enacting clause of the ATS
provides federal jurisdiction over any civil action. A civil action must
contain three interrelated ingredients: a plaintiff, a defendant, and a
claim.
The first proviso of the ATS requires the plaintiff of the action to be
“an alien.” In ordinary usage, the word “alien” describes “a person who
was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States, who is subject to
some foreign government, and who has not been naturalized under U.S.
law.”131 Corporate entities are not born, nor can they be naturalized, so
the ordinary meaning would indicate only natural persons are aliens.
However, because U.S. courts appear to treat “alien corporations” similar
to natural alien persons in many respects, 132 the inquiry should not end
here.
If a corporation can be an ATS plaintiff, courts should not prevent
them from appearing as defendants as well. The Kiobel majority
summarily dismissed an argument by Harold Koh pointing out that
international law has, over time, distributed more rights to corporate
entities, and those rights, by a “parity of reasoning,” ought to entail
corresponding obligations.133 Koh explained that since transnational
corporations may bring suits under international law (to ICSID
arbitration, for example), they must be subjects of that law, and
therefore, according to Koh, they ought to be correspondingly amenable
to suit under that law.134 Similarly, if a corporation can sue under the
ATS, it ought to be amenable to suit under that law as well.
At least one foreign corporation has filed an ATS claim as a
plaintiff.135 The corporation had sued Argentina, so sovereign immunity
blocked the claim because the defendant was not appropriate.136
Nevertheless the case went all the way to the Supreme Court, and the
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viability of the corporate plaintiff was not questioned once.137 Since the
Supreme Court tacitly allowed corporations to be ATS plaintiffs, by an
analogous parity of reasoning, the ATS should not disqualify suits that
name corporate defendants.138 Chief Justice Rehnquist said as much,
writing for the unanimous Court, “[t]he Alien Tort Statute by its terms
does not distinguish among classes of defendants, and it of course has the
same effect after the passage of the [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act]
as before with respect to defendants other than foreign states.”139
The next proviso places two unrelated limitations on ATS causes of
action. The plaintiff’s civil action must be a claim for a tort only. The
tort requirement may be satisfied by virtually any injury alleged by the
plaintiff.140 This, like the alien requirement, seems straightforward.
Lastly, the tort must have been committed in violation of the law of
nations. This final requirement incorporates standards that relate not
only to the substance of the injury, a legal question, but also to the
factual circumstances surrounding its commission.
Importantly, of the three necessary components of civil actions—
plaintiff, defendant, and claim—the Alien Tort Statute addresses only
two. It categorically restricts all but a limited specific group of plaintiffs
and all but a limited subset of claims. The phrasing does not address the
nature of any prospective defendant. The Kiobel concurrence takes the
statute at face value. Plaintiffs are limited. Claims are limited. Since no
limitation is placed on defendants, none is intended.
The majority, by contrast, saw an incomplete statute: the ATS
strictly limits the viability of plaintiffs and claims, but there is a gap
regarding viable defendants. Filling that gap presents a choice-of-law
issue. Resolving this issue is difficult, in part because of the
expansiveness of the phrase “any civil action,”141 and in part because
“Congress has incorporated by reference” offenses defined by the law of
nations, rather than “crystallizing in permanent form and in minute detail
every offense” that could arise.142 There is, therefore, a fundamental
ambiguity in this statute. To resolve the statutory ambiguity, we turn to
other pronouncements of the legislature to interpret the language in a
manner consistent with its objectives.
137
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142 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30, n.6 (1942) (construing a “violation of the law of
war” by comparison with other “law of nations” provisions).
138
139

66

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 8:43

B. Congress Did Not Intend to Limit ATS Defendants, Except to Bar Suits
Against Foreign Sovereigns.
Since the statute is ambiguous, it is worthwhile to examine the
legislative history to understand how the ATS incorporated the law of
nations in the eighteenth century, and how it incorporates today’s
customary international law.
1. Historical Background
The Alien Tort Statute—codified by the First U.S. Congress, and
signed by George Washington—has remained essentially unchanged
since its codification in section 9 of the First Judiciary Act of 1789, but
its use, even at the time of enactment, was unknown. From 1789–1980,
federal courts heard only two ATS cases. The first, a 1795 admiralty
case, invoked a violation of a U.S. treaty;143 the second, a 1961 custody
dispute, pleaded a violation of the law of nations.144 Neither decision
provided any substantial interpretation of the ambiguous text.
The Supreme Court has comprehensively analyzed the ATS only
once, in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain.145 Justice Souter lamented that the
“poverty of drafting history,” regarding the Alien Tort provision, makes
it “fair to say that a consensus understanding of what Congress intended
has proven elusive.”146 The lack of legislative record, however, has been
compensated by a wealth of subsequent scholarship on the subject.147
Because open-ended statutory terms were not clarified by the legislative
history, the Court thoroughly plumbed the historical record to gain a
sense of the statute in the context of its time.
Given its rare usage, commentators, historians, and jurists have
proposed several possible motivations for passing the ATS. The Framers
may have felt a moral duty to open their courts to aliens: “Cursed is
anyone who withholds justice from the foreigner . . . .”148 Congress may
have been attempting pragmatic statecraft by demonstrating to the world
143
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145 542 U.S. 692 (2004). While Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, is the only significant
Supreme Court decision regarding the Alien Tort Statute, it is not the only ATS claim to
come before the Court. See also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (decided one
day before Sosa) (“The fact that petitioners in these cases are being held in military
custody is immaterial to the question of the District Court’s jurisdiction over their [ATS
and other] claims.”); O’Reilly De Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45 (1908).
146 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718–19 (2004).
147 E.g., M. Anderson Berry, Whether Foreigner or Alien: A New Look at the Original
Language of the Alien Tort Statute, 27 BERK. J. INT’L L. 316 (2009) (The word
“foreigner” in the Senate’s first draft was changed to “alien”).
148 Deuteronomy 27:19.
144

2011] CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TORTS

67

how the fledgling nation was paying “decent respect to the opinions of
mankind.”149 One scholar posited that “tort” referred exclusively to
naval prize cases.150 The Supreme Court surmised that the law of nations
in the era of the Framers included bodies of norms such as lex
mercatoria and the laws of war, and the ATS at the time of drafting
probably would have comprehended three international law torts
described by Blackstone in England’s criminal law: maritime piracy,
offenses against ambassadors, and the violation of safe conducts.151
Another theory, recently voiced by Judge Kleinfeld of the Ninth Circuit,
asserts that the ATS solved Congress’s “incapacity to deal with such
matters as the Marbois Incident.”152 (When François Marbois, a French
consul, was assaulted in 1784, Congress “lacked any judicial authority in
Pennsylvania,” where this tort occurred, and could only “act[] as a
cheerleader to the Pennsylvania courts.”153)
The Supreme Court had good reason to spend so much time in the
18th century when deciding Sosa: it is axiomatic that a law should be
interpreted in light of the evils it was designed to prevent.154 Thus,
references to William Blackstone,155 nods to Alexander Hamilton,156 and
discussions of Bolchos157 remain de rigueur today. Further speculation
on this front, however, is not likely to inform the debate about corporate
ATS liability. Another method of discerning legislative intent might be
to look at how the Framers might have expected the statute to be
interpreted in their own day.
149

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 445 (1995) (cited for interpretive context in Sosa, 542
U.S. at 718, but not endorsed by any Justice). Many prize cases considered by the
Supreme Court do track the language of the ATS without citing it specifically. E.g., The
Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210 (1844) (Pirates were hostis humani generis; a ship owner was
liable for violations of the law of nations committed by the captain and crew).
151 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714–15 (2004) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (1769)). Cf. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 814–15 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
152 Sarai v. Rio Tinto, 625 F.3d 561, 564 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kleinfeld J., dissenting from
the order to mediate); see also Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111, 1784 WL 85
(1784); Jeremy K. Schrag, A Federal Framework for Regulating the Growing
International Presence of the Several States, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 425 (2009) (recounting
the 1784 Marbois Incident).
153 Schrag, supra note 152.
154 The axiom goes back at least as far as Heydon’s Case, (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637,
638 (K.B.) (Lord Coke).
155 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 125 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing 2
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES).
156 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 784 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton)).
157 Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (discussed in Doe v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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2. Construing Corporate Responsibility in Federal Courts—Early
1800s
Given the paucity of drafting history and the likelihood that the
Supreme Court will revisit historical sources when it hears this issue, it
might be useful to explore how the statute would have been interpreted
around the time of its passage. As it so happens, a contemporaneous
interpretation of a similar statute exists.
In Bank of the United States v. M’Kenzie, a legal entity
incorporated in Pennsylvania brought suit for nonpayment of a loan
against a debtor in Virginia.158 McKenzie defaulted in 1821.159 When
the bank sued in 1828, Virginia’s statute of limitations barred the suit.160
The bank argued that it could not have violated the statute of limitations
because the statute did not apply to corporations.161 On demurrer, Chief
Justice Marshall rejected the bank’s argument:
The enacting clause does not contemplate the character of the
plaintiff, but looks singly to the action itself . . . . In construing
this section, it is entirely unimportant, by whom the suit is
brought. The action is equally barred by length of time, whoever
may be the plaintiff. The plain words of the statute are decisive.
Nor does any reason of justice or policy exist, which should take
a corporation out of these words. The legislature could have no
motive for limiting the time, within which a suit should be
brought by an individual, which does not apply with equal force
to a suit brought by a corporation.162

Marshall’s two responses to the bank’s contention—one based on
the statutory language, the other based on policy—can be analogously
applied to reject the argument of the Kiobel majority that the Alien Tort
Statute forbids corporations as defendants. The enacting clause of the
ATS does not contemplate the character of the defendant; instead, it
looks to the action itself and the nature of the plaintiff.163 The plain
words decisively allow any civil action, whoever the defendant may be.
Moreover, no reason of justice or policy exists to excise corporate
defendants from the ATS. International law could have no motive for
imposing human rights obligations on sovereigns and natural persons
without imposing them equally strongly on juridical persons. To the
158 Bank of United States v. M’Kenzie, 2 Brock 393, 2 F.Cas. 718, 721 (Cir. Ct. D.
Va. 1829).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 719.
161 Id. at 719–20.
162 Id.
163 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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contrary, human rights law has an abiding interest in protecting the civil,
political, and judicial rights of all people from any and all infringers.
The ATS, by its own terms, therefore would apply with equal force to a
natural person, or a corporate person.
C. The majority erred in its interpretation of Sosa
“[W]e are required,” Judge Cabranes wrote, “to look to
international law to determine whether corporate liability for a ‘violation
of the law of nations’ . . . . is a norm ‘accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity . . . .’”164 Required? International law does not
require this inquiry. The statute does not require this inquiry either, as
explained above. No other federal law requires this limitation. Rather,
the source of this “requirement” is footnote 20 of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.165
The Sosa decision has attracted some criticism for its lack of
clarity.166 The Kiobel majority made four errors reading Sosa, two of
which involved erroneous reliance on footnote 20. First, the footnote
draws a distinction between public actors (sovereigns) and private actors
(individuals and corporations),167 but the majority’s further distinction
between individuals and corporations was not warranted. Second, the
majority failed to appreciate the policy reasons underlying footnote 20’s
distinction, and failed to place it in context. Third, the majority’s
repeated reference to procedural “norms” of international law gives that
word a broader sense than it was given by the Supreme Court. Fourth,
the implications of the majority’s position lead to logical conclusions that
would likely have been rejected by the Supreme Court.
1. Footnote 20 Invokes the Public/Private International Law
Dichotomy, and Makes No Distinction Among Private Entities
Footnote 20 in Sosa is ambiguous.
It states: “A related
consideration is whether international law extends the scope of liability
for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”168 The
footnote then cites discussions of the public/private distinction in Tel-

164 Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing the ATS, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004)).
165 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20.
166 E.g., Stephen Satterfield, Still Crying Out for Clarification: The Scope of Liability
Under the Alien Tort Statute After Sosa, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 216 (2008).
167 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20.
168 Id.
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Oren and Kadic.169 This sentence could be read to differentiate between
public and private actors. It could further be read to differentiate
between individual private actors and corporate private actors.
The majority is not wrong to consider the nature of the actor who
allegedly violated the law of nations. Violations of the law of nations
often turn on this distinction. To use Judge Friendly’s famous example,
if a private individual or an agent of a private corporation takes property
from a foreigner, he has violated a universally accepted rule frequently
rendered, “thou shalt not steal,” but he has not violated the law of
nations.170 The same act, if carried out under color of State law, would
now be called uncompensated “expropriation,” which is a remediable
violation of customary international law.171 For another example, when
an individual ties up his neighbor and beats him, demanding to know
who damaged his roof, the victim has been tortured, but he has a claim
only for false imprisonment and battery. But if a government worker
seizes a foreigner, confines him, and brutalizes him to obtain
information, he has committed official torture.172 No one would deny
that it violates the law of nations.
The essential difference between theft and expropriation is the
character of the actor. That difference also transforms a battery, a private
wrong, into torture, an offense against civilization itself. It should go
without saying, and the majority acknowledges, that the nature of the
actor is frequently the deciding factor as to whether there has been a
violation of the law of nations.173 For norms such as these, the nature of
the perpetrator is relevant to the nature of the violation. But no State
action is required for other norms, such as those prohibiting human
trafficking, genocide, war crimes, piracy, hijacking of aircraft, or, as
alleged in Kiobel, aiding and abetting a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights.174
In support of its inquiry into whether international law assigns
corporate liability, the majority also quotes Justice Breyer’s concurring
opinion in Sosa, which interpreted footnote 20 to mean that “[t]he norm
[of international law] must extend liability to the type of perpetrator (e.g.

169

Id.
See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
171 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/5344 at 15 ¶4 (Dec.
14, 1962) Although different definitions of expropriation have since arisen, this
document is considered to be the codification of customary international law.
172 See Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
173 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 122 (2d Cir. 2010).
174 E.g. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091 (genocide), 1651 (piracy), 2441 (war crimes).
170
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a private actor) the plaintiff seeks to sue.”175 However, Justice Breyer
misinterpreted footnote 20. ATS jurisdiction does not depend on
whether liability is assigned to certain perpetrators. Rather, the test is
whether the law of nations is violated.
Consider a child soldier who enlists his young friends. Liability
could not be imposed against him because no international tribunal is
competent to try juvenile offenders,176 but he has, unquestionably,
violated the law of nations.177 Under Justice Breyer’s interpretation, the
child has committed no violation. That is wrong. Footnote 20 is not
among Justice Souter’s most artful sentences, but it is meant to tread the
familiar line between public and private international law. The Kiobel
majority should not have adopted Justice Breyer’s assertion as its rule of
decision.
2. Policy Interests Underlie Scope of Liability Inquiry
Footnote 20 implicates the “scope of liability,” which is not a
principle of international law. Rather, it is a term of art in tort law in the
area of proximate causation. The Supreme Court guided lower courts to
first determine whether an ATS complaint alleged violation of a specific
and universal norm, and, if this jurisdictional requirement is met, a court
must then ascertain whether it would be advisable for a U.S. court to hear
the matter.178 Footnote 20 occurs in the context of the second inquiry
into justiciability, an issue that the Supreme Court did not reach in Sosa
because Alvarez’s claim was dismissed on its merits.
Lower courts must avoid enmeshing the United States in
international disputes by considering several relevant factors, one of
which, described in footnote 20, dealt with the scope of liability extended
by customary international law. This “additional consideration”179 was
meant to help judges evaluate the potential repercussions if liability were
to be imposed by a United States court. Plainly, certain cases may
present defendants over whom it is not appropriate to exercise federal
jurisdiction, even if jurisdictional criteria are otherwise met. In such
cases, general justiciability limitations may justify dismissal in isolated
cases for reasons of forum non conveniens, comity, or sovereign
175 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 127–28 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 760
(2004) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
176
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 at
art. 26 (July 17, 1989).
177
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res 44/25, art. 38(2) (effective
1990). 139 states have ratified the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict (entered into force 2002); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2442.
178 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20 (2004).
179 Id.
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immunity. The instruction should not generate categorical exclusion of a
certain class of defendants.
Thus, this inquiry is important, not because the statute requires it,
but rather because it implicates the general justiciability principles that
constrain the federal judiciary. The Kiobel court erred by inquiring
whether international law extends liability to a specific type of defendant
without considering the policy rationale for this judicially created
inquiry. The Second Circuit’s intense focus on corporate liability does
not serve the purposes animating the edicts of Congress, the prerogatives
of the executive branch, or the abiding global interests in human rights
protection.
3. “Norms” of International Law in Sosa Are Substantive, Not
Procedural
The word “prohibition” could be substituted for every instance of
the word “norm” in Justices Souter’s, Scalia’s, and Breyer’s Sosa
opinions. Some exemplars: “[t]he determination whether a norm is
sufficiently definite to support a cause of action . . . ;”180 “[s]ince
enforcement of an international norm by one nation’s courts implies that
other nations’ courts may do the same . . . ;”181 and “[o]ne of the norms at
issue in that case was the norm against genocide. . . . ”182 The Kiobel
minority correctly understood that “norms,” as that word was used by the
Supreme Court, indicate rules of conduct.183
By contrast, the majority in Kiobel uses the word “norm” to
means something akin to “principle.” For example, “provisions
imposing corporate liability in some recent specialized treaties have not
established corporate liability as a norm of customary international
law.”184 According to Judge Leval, the majority erred by using the word
to indicate rules of procedure, rules of jurisdiction, rules of liability, or
rules of remedies. 185
The majority’s use of the term “norm” in different subtle ways
throughout the opinion renders its decision less legitimate. Consider:
“[t]he defining legal achievement of the Nuremberg trials is that they
explicitly recognized individual liability for the violation of specific,
universal, and obligatory norms of international human rights,”186 but
180

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
Id. at 748.
Id. at 761.
183 Id.
184 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 139 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis
added).
185 Id. at 171 (Leval, J., concurring).
186 Id. at 127.
181
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“international tribunals have consistently declined to recognize corporate
liability as a norm of customary international law,”187 and “[o]ur
recognition of a norm of liability as a matter of domestic law, therefore,
cannot create a norm of customary international law.”188
This
broadening of the term means that some norms of international law no
longer provide the substantive basis for violations of the law.
Incidentally, it is possible to reach the majority’s conclusion
without a confused reference to “norms.” As Julian Ku wrote, “neither
historic nor contemporary international precedents establish a consensus
in favor of imposing liability on private corporations, particularly with
respect to violations of jus cogens norms.”189 However, the U.S.
Supreme Court evidently preferred to use “norm” vaguely, and avoided
any mention of jus cogens.
4. The Majority’s Conclusion Parallels an Argument Rejected in
Sosa
The Kiobel majority also failed to take into account the spirit of the
“rule” it was discovering. Álvarez-Machaín asserted that “his arrest was
arbitrary and as such forbidden by international law not because it
infringed the prerogatives of Mexico, but because no applicable law
authorized it.”190 The Supreme Court swatted this argument away,
stating that the plaintiff was improperly invoking a “general
prohibition . . . regardless of the circumstances” and indicated that he
was redefining the word “arbitrary” to create a “broad rule.”191
However, in a similar fashion, the Kiobel majority in essence asserts
corporate liability is forbidden under the ATS, not because international
law’s prerogatives are infringed, but because there is no universal norm
authorizing it. Thus the majority’s line of reasoning is as specious as
Álvarez-Machaín’s: it invokes a general prohibition—the lack of civil
corporate liability or criminal corporate liability in international fora—to
create a broad rule, that those entities are not subjects of human rights
law. To paraphrase Justice Souter: this view would support corporate
immunity from ATS claims in federal court, for any human rights abuse,
anywhere in the world, without any cognizance of Congress’s power to
establish the jurisdiction of the federal courts.192 In short, international

187
188
189
190
191
192

Id. at 146.
Id. at 103, 118, and 127.
Ku, supra note 23, at 377 (emphasis added).
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 736 (2004).
Id.
Id. at 713.
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law would trump federal law to determine this aspect of jurisdiction in
American courts.
That result would be unconstitutional. Argentine Republic should
have informed the Kiobel majority’s construction of the ATS, as it
illustrates the “settled proposition that the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts is determined by Congress ‘in the exact degrees
and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public
good.’”193
This principle indicates that Congress, not international law, has the
exclusive power to expand or limit its own jurisdictional provisions.
Congress controls the field when it comes to limitations on ATS
defendants. The Kiobel majority, by contrast, held that international law,
not federal law, decides whether corporations can be ATS defendants.194
The majority’s holding gives international law more power over the
jurisdictional provisions of United States courts than Congress has.195
The majority was wrong to fill the ATS gap—its silence regarding
defendants—with international law. Furthermore, by the majority’s own
admission, it has merely discovered that no international tribunal is
equipped with jurisdiction over transnational corporations with power to
assign damages against them. Human rights law is meant to be
universal, and the majority shows no evidence that international law
excludes corporations from the universe. The lack of a positive principle
of corporate exclusion is just as suspicious as the lack of a positive
principle of corporate liability. Thus, just as the ATS does not indicate a
party that may be sued, there is a gap in international law regarding
corporate liability. The majority thus interprets an exclusion, and fills
the ATS gap regarding defendants with this judge-made rule.
D. The ATS is 20 Years Old, Not 200
1. 102nd Congress: Approves Filártiga, and Expressly Allows Two
Causes of Action
In 1991, the 102nd Congress considered the limited usefulness of
the ATS over the past 200 years and its revival by the modern line of
193

Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. 425, 433 (1989)
(internal citation omitted).
194
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2010).
195
For the opposing view, see Chimene I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in
Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 103 (2008) (noting “international law, not federal
common law, governs the standards for accomplice liability at both the jurisdictional and
merits stages”); see also Ku, supra note 23, at 368 (referring to Talisman’s belief that
international law controlled the inquiry).
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ATS jurisprudence. In the legislative record, Congress approved of
Filártiga by name and endorsed subsequent cases that vindicated human
rights abuses in U.S. courts. In its new human rights context, Congress
saw two problems with the present wording of the ATS. First, foreigners
ought not to be given more access to U.S. courts than U.S. citizens enjoy.
Second, judges faced the difficult task of formulating causes of action
when neither international law nor federal law explicitly provided a right
to sue for human rights abuses. Congress solved these two dilemmas in
an unusual way. It passed the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
(“TVPA”) alongside the ATS, as a Note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350.196
As one Congressman explained, the TVPA would “enhance the
remedy already available under section 1350 in an important respect:
While the Alien Tort Claims Act provides a remedy to aliens only, the
TVPA would extend a civil remedy also to U.S. citizens who may have
been tortured abroad.”197 This statement also validates Filártiga’s
holding that the ATS could be applied to conduct that occurred outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.198 Congress selected two
jus cogens violations of international law and formed two causes of
action—covering the torts of torture and extrajudicial killing—for which
the ATS would provide jurisdiction.199 Even though Judge Bork’s
concurring opinion in Tel-Oren had not been followed, Congress
evidently worried about his refusal to hear a case without an express
grant of jurisdiction over definite causes of action. “The TVPA would
provide such a grant . . . . At the same time, claims based on torture or
summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions that may
appropriately be covered by [the ATS].”200 Consequently, “[t]hat statute
should remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already
exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary international
law.”201
While Congress was deliberating the TVPA, it could have replaced
or amended the archaic-sounding ATS. Instead of doing so, Congress
enshrined two substantive causes of action as an explanatory Note to this
jurisdictional statute, simultaneously validating and abrogating Bork’s
concerns. This Note could be monumentally helpful to jurists. First of
all, Congress has taken a direct stand on what might have been a dubious
196

Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3 (1991); see also S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 137–38
(1991).
198 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 625 F.3d 561, 563–64 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting)
(quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010)).
199 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
200 H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, at 3 (1991).
201 H.R. REP. NO. 102-367 (1991) (emphasis added).
197
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interpretation of this statute and expressed clear approval of the modern
construction that has emerged since Filártiga. Second, these two
“sample” causes of action should assist judges in the formulation of new
categories of claims.
In passing the TVPA, Congress essentially re-enacted the ATS,
giving it a modern meaning and a modern intention, despite its use of the
passé vernacular “law of nations.” While a nominal nod to the 18th
century drafters may not be inappropriate, the interpretive adventure
begins anew with what Congress intended this ambiguous sentence to
mean at the time of its (re)enacting. The ATS now unequivocally
provides jurisdiction for causes of action based on violations of human
rights norms.
The legislative history further indicates an intention that the TVPA
apply to abuses perpetrated abroad. “Judicial protections against flagrant
human rights violations are often least effective in those countries where
such abuses are most prevalent. A state that practices torture and
summary execution is not one that adheres to the rule of law . . . . The
Torture Victim Protection Act would respond to this situation.”202
Nevertheless, appellate judges are split on the issue of ATS
extraterritoriality. Judge Kleinfeld of the Ninth Circuit recently stated
that the ATS cannot be applied to acts occurring outside the U.S., finding
that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, it has none.”203 Another court has held that the ATS applies
only extraterritorially.204 Defendants have argued that the TVPA
supplants or preempts the ATS.205 This construction has been rejected.206
However, the TVPA ought to inform how judges craft new causes of
action based on other norms of customary international law. TVPA
causes of action are subject to several limitations: plaintiffs are limited; a

202

H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3 (1991).
Sarei, 625 F.3d at 563–64 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct.
at 2878).
204 See Velez v. Sanchez, 754 F. Supp. 2d 488, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he Court
has not found a single post-Filartiga case addressing claims arising out of domestic
conduct; all of the conduct of which Velez complains occurred in the United States . . . .
Velez’s claims of domestic human trafficking and forced labor are not within Filartiga’s
conception of the statute’s grant of jurisdiction.”).
205 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004).
206 E.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1250–51
(11th Cir. 2005); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp 2d 1164, 1178 n.13
(C.D. Cal. 2005). Contra Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005).
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statute of limitations of ten years is imposed; and exhaustion of
“adequate and available” remedies abroad is a prerequisite.207
The legislative history indicates minimal consideration of the scope
of liability, but it does lay out clear prioritization of policy: “There are,
of course, situations in which application of this statute could create
difficulties in our relations with friendly countries. But this is a small
price to pay in order to see that justice is done for the victims of
torture.”208 In response to a question about viable defendants, one
Senator indicated an expansive scope of liability.209 Except for those
who enjoy diplomatic or sovereign immunity, “only defendants over
which a court in the United States has personal jurisdiction may be
sued.”210
To sum up, Congress considered changing the ATS, but opted for
flexibility by retaining the original language. This ought to be
considered a recent reenactment of the statute that explicitly approves of
its application to causes of action for two jus cogens violations that
would have no other territorial connection to the United States. Congress
also explicitly intended for those causes of action to be illustrative and
not exhaustive.
Congress further assumed the “gap” regarding
defendants would be filled by federal law—statutory immunity for
foreign sovereigns and personal jurisdiction limitations that exclude
defendants with no ties to the United States.
2. Construing Corporate Liability Under the TVPA: A Circuit Split
Because the TVPA should inform any interpretation of the ATS, it
is worthwhile to ask whether the TVPA applies to corporations.211 The
TVPA states that “[a]n individual . . . who subjects an individual to
torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual.”212
Unlike the ATS, which only mentions plaintiffs, the TVPA refers to both
plaintiffs and defendants. Circuit courts are split as to whether the term
used to characterize defendants—individual—includes legal persons.
A district court within the Eleventh Circuit allowed a torture claim
against a corporation, accepting plaintiff’s argument “that by imposing
liability on ‘individuals who subject others to torture or extrajudicial
207 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728, 731 (discussing the TVPA generally); see also Sosa,
542 U.S. at 733 n.21 (indicating the Court might find the TVPA’s exhaustion requirement
relevant in a future case on that issue).
208 137 Cong. Rec. H 11,244-04 (1991).
209 S. REP. NO. 102-249 (1991).
210 Id.
211 See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
212 Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2, 106 Stat. 73
(1992).
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killing,’ the word ‘individual’ is equivalent to ‘person’ . . . .
[C]orporations are generally treated as persons in other areas of law[;]
therefore, liability under the TVPA should also extend to
corporations.”213 To support this holding, the Court looked to legislative
intent and to precedent. It found no legislative intent to create “any
exemption for private corporations, and courts have held corporations
liable for violations of international law under the related AT[S].”214
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Clinton v. New York recently held that
the term ‘‘individual’’ is synonymous with ‘‘person,’’ acknowledging
that ‘‘‘person’ often has a broader meaning in the law’’ than in ordinary
usage.215 [I]t is reasonable to conclude that had Congress intended to
exclude corporations from liability under the TVPA, it could and would
have expressly stated so.216 The Ninth Circuit then reached the opposite
conclusion:
Congress’s use of the word “individual” throughout the statute
indicates that it did not intend for the TVPA to apply to
corporations. Indeed, Congress [in the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C.
§ 1] has directed courts to presume the word “individual” in a
statute refers to natural persons and not corporations . . . .
[However, that presumption did not apply where a] statute used
the words “individual” and “person” interchangeably throughout.
Here, in contrast, it is evident that Congress drafted the TVPA in
such a manner as to limit liability to natural persons. The TVPA
consistently uses “individual” throughout the statute to refer both
to the torturer and the victim of torture. (“An individual who . . .
subjects an individual to torture.”). Corporations, of course,
cannot be tortured [because they] cannot suffer physical injury.
Plaintiffs ask us to give the same word different meanings in the
same statute. They ask us to interpret “individual” to mean a
natural person when referring to the victim, but to mean either a
natural person or a corporation when referring to the torturer.
This interpretation of the statute runs counter to the “normal rule
of statutory construction that identical words used in different
parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”

213 Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1358–59 (S.D. Fla. 2003),
aff’d 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009).
214 Id.
215 Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998).
216 Sinaltrainal, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1358–59. (internal citations omitted).
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There is no indication Congress intended “individual” to have a
variety of meanings throughout the TVPA.217

Even before Kiobel, the Second Circuit agreed with the Ninth,
using similar reasoning:
Under the TVPA, the term “individual” describes both those who
can violate its proscriptions against torture, as well as those who
can be victims of torture . . . . “[B]oth from context and common
sense only natural persons can be the ‘individual’ victims of acts
that inflict ‘severe pain and suffering.’ Because the TVPA uses
same term ‘individual’ to identify offenders, the definition of
‘individual’ within the statute appears to refer to a human being,
suggesting that only natural persons can violate the Act.” 218

After Kiobel, the D.C. Circuit reached this conclusion as well.219
This reasoning essentially grants corporations complete immunity from
TVPA torture claims. Since a corporation cannot be tortured it cannot
commit torture either, unless we give the same word two different
meanings. (Paradoxically, while corporate defendants embrace this
argument, they reject the similar logic of Harold Koh’s parity idea.220)
An alternative to either interpretation is that Congress’s consistent
use of the word “individual” was meant to stand in contraposition to the
word “alien” in the ATS. That is, Congress intended to increase the class
of possible claimants to comprise U.S. nationals as well as aliens, and
did not take a position on holding Chevron or Coca-Cola accountable.221
The legislative context supports this interpretation. In 1991, no
ATS claim had attempted to hold a corporate entity liable for
international torts. Doe v. Unocal, the first ATS claim that sustained
jurisdiction against a corporate defendant, was not filed until 1996.222
Congress most likely never anticipated the aiding and abetting actions
that have arisen since the TVPA was passed. As the title of the act
indicates, Congress was focused on the victims—not the perpetrators—

217 Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal
citations omitted).
218 Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d at 254, 323–24 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (quoting In re
Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)).
219 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also id. (Kavanaugh
J., dissenting).
220 Koh, supra note 133.
221 See Eric Engle, The Torture Victim’s Protection Act, the Alien Tort Claims Act,
and Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge, 67 ALB. L. REV. 501, 503 n.14 (2003)
(explaining eight obstacles to ATS jurisdiction).
222 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
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of torture. Moreover, the title of a statute may be considered when
construing its meaning.223
Because the alternative construction may be just as specious as
those advanced by the circuits, we may fall back on maxims of statutory
construction to at least obtain consistency in the result. But the warring
canons of interpretation here similarly have no clear winner. On the one
hand, “[t]he same language used repeatedly in the same connection is
presumed to bear the same meaning throughout the statute . . . .”224
However, “[t]his presumption will be disregarded where it is necessary
to assign different meanings to make the statute consistent.”225 It is true
that a corporation cannot be tortured, so it cannot not be a victim under
the TVPA.
(Anticompetitive practices or over-regulation may
analogously “hurt” a corporation’s bottom line, but they do not count.
The ordinary meaning of “torture” involves physical injury.) But the
converse—that a corporation, acting through its agents, could not commit
torture—is not true. To give “individual” the same meaning in both
places would lead to an absurd conclusion. “Nothing is better settled
than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will
effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an
unjust or an absurd conclusion.”226 As Justice Scalia instructs: “[a] text
should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently;
it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”227
As the foregoing analysis indicates, both interpretations of the
TVPA are unreasonable. If “individual” includes corporations as
perpetrators but not as victims of torture, then the construction is absurd,
though the result fairly realizes Congress’s intent to secure justice for
victims. If “individual” does not include corporations, then the word has
a consistent meaning throughout the sentence, but the result eliminates
the concept of respondeat superior for torture cases. This is the key
issue which the Supreme Court must resolve. True to form, however, the
Court will likely resolve the matter on ideological lines. Perhaps, then,
Congress should resolve the ambiguity that it created itself.228
223

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998).
See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06
(1949) (illustrating the premise that every canon of construction has a counter-canon).
225 Id. at 404.
226 Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 59 (1892).
227 Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23
(1997).
228 See generally Lucien J. Dhooge, A Modest Proposal to Amend the Alien Tort
Statute to Provide Guidance to Transnational Corporations, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 119 (2007) (drafting statutory language that would elegantly resolve nearly all the
issues raised by Kiobel, Flomo, and Exxon).
224
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IV. WHICH LAW PROVIDES THE CAUSE OF ACTION?
The Supreme Court has held that the ATS provides jurisdiction
only. With one exception—the Torture Victim’s Protection Act—no law
explicitly grants causes of action to alien plaintiffs. The cases against
Shell, Firestone, and Exxon, however, all allege corporate liability on a
theory of aiding and abetting, which is not covered under the TVPA.
Where should a plaintiff look to see whether he or she has a case? Three
bodies of law seem plausible: international law itself, lex loci (the law of
the place where the harm occurred), or U.S. federal common law. After
the jurisdictional issue was settled in Filártiga v. Peña Irala, the district
court took an extraordinary approach to answering this question.
A. Patchwork Cause of Action
Peña did not participate in the proceedings after the Second
Circuit’s landmark opinion,229 but before default judgment could be
lodged against him, the district court realized that while the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction had been settled, it still needed to contend
with the ambiguity of the statute:
[What is] the nature of the “action” over which the [ATS] affords
jurisdiction[?] Does the “tort” to which the statute refers mean a
wrong “in violation of the law of nations” or merely a wrong
actionable under the law of the appropriate sovereign state? The
latter construction would make the violation of international law
pertinent only to afford jurisdiction. The court would then, in
accordance with traditional conflict of laws principles, apply the
substantive law of [the place the tort occurred]. If the “tort” to
which the statute refers is the violation of international law, the
court must look to that body of law to determine what substantive
principles to apply.230

The court found two reasons to look to the law of nations for the
substantive cause of action. First, it is a better policy: if the ATS was
solely jurisdictional, and the cause of action had to be provided by the
sovereign State where it occurred, it could “invit[e] frustration of the
purposes of international law by individual states that enact immunities
for government personnel or other such exemptions or limitations.”231

229 Peña had been deported for overstaying his visa. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d
876, 878–79 (2d Cir. 1980). However, given his characterization by Judge Kaufman, he
may not have wanted to appear: “the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader
before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.” Id. at 890.
230 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
231 Id. at 863.
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Second, in U.S. federal courts, it makes sense to apply international law
because U.S. common law incorporates the customary law of nations.232
Turning to Filártiga, the court found customary international law,
as recorded in the U.N.’s torture convention, enjoins the nations of the
world to compensate torture victims “in accordance with national
law.”233 Following the instructions of the law of nations, the court
looked to the laws of Paraguay.234 It found that Paraguay’s Constitution
prohibited the act of torture, that its criminal code penalized torturers,
and that its civil code provided remedies of pecuniary damages, “moral
damage[s],” and costs and attorney’s fees, but not punitive damages.235
However, the court perceived that “punishment is an appropriate
objective under the law of nations,” and, since “the interests of the global
community transcend those of any one state,” the court “conclude[d] that
it is essential and proper to grant the remedy of punitive damages in
order to give effect to the manifest objectives of the international
prohibition against torture.”236
Importantly, the district court recognized the international law norm
condemning torture into a judge-made common-law private right of
action that allowed redress of tortious conduct in U.S. courts.237 To
accomplish this task, it drew on the recorded norms of international
(criminal) law to formulate that a cause of action existed.238 Then,
because international law deferred to individual nations for enforcement,
the court consulted the interests of international law before applying
remedies available (only) under U.S. law.239 Judge Katzmann, as
discussed above, made this process explicit in Khulumani, detailing how
the Second Circuit “has consistently relied on criminal law norms in
establishing the content of customary international law for purposes of
the AT[S].”240
This is patchwork-quilt jurisprudence. But it reflects a wellreasoned interpretive solution grounded in a moral imperative to prevent
norms of international law from becoming “mere benevolent yearnings
never to be given effect.”241
232 Id. (citing Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 886; The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 422 (1815); The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
233 Id. (quoting the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected
to Torture, art. 11, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N.Doc. A/1034 (1975)).
234 Filártiga at 862.
235 Id. at 865.
236 Id. at 863, 865.
237 Id. at 862.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 863–64.
240 Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 270 n.5 (2d Cir. 2007).
241 Filártiga, 577 F. Supp. at 863.
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B. “Arising Under” vs. “In Violation Of”
The problem of the cause of action in ATS cases has bedeviled
judges and advocates. The statute provides jurisdiction only, so a cause
of action must either be found or formulated. Judge Bork in Tel-Oren
would require that plaintiffs find causes of action arising under
international law. The Kiobel majority agreed, noting that international
law has created causes of action in other contexts, and that some of the
rules of law are procedural rather than substantive.242 For example,
maritime pirates or human rights violators could be subject to universal
jurisdiction for their offenses, because universal jurisdiction is a specific
and universal norm that has arisen over time by custom.243
The ATS, by its terms, does not require that an explicit cause of
action be found in a specific body of law. In this respect, the ATS differs
from the other statutes that confer jurisdiction in federal courts. For
federal question jurisdiction, “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.”244 A civil action does not arise under a law
or treaty unless the law or the treaty explicitly provides for such lawsuits.
The Kiobel majority, like Bork, erred by treating the ATS as if it
contains the words “arising under.” As the Second Circuit noted in
Kadic, “[b]ecause the Alien Tort Act requires that plaintiffs plead a
‘violation of the law of nations’ at the jurisdictional threshold, this statute
requires a more searching review of the merits to establish jurisdiction
than is required under the more flexible ‘arising under’ formula of
section 1331.”245 The court stated that ATS claims had heightened
pleading standards that require plaintiffs to “adequately plead[] a
violation of the law of nations,” and not “merely a colorable
violation.”246
Since the passage of the TVPA, the searching review need not be so
perplexing. Congress reviewed the policy reasons favoring and
disfavoring the extensive litigation under the ATS; it concluded that U.S.
leadership on human rights was a national priority, and it provided civil
remedies to be an effective way of imposing justice on oppressors.
Furthermore, the TVPA’s causes of action are examples that should
242

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117–18 (2d Cir. 2010).
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW
ENGLAND L. REV. 311 (2001).
244 28 U.S.C. §1331 (2006).
245 Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted); see
also Beth Stevens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis
of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1,
40 (2002).
246 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238.
243
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serve to clear up some of the “lurking issues” in ATS jurisprudence.247
The ATS absolutely applies extraterritorially.248 Principles of exhaustion
apply, so plaintiffs must first fail to obtain judicial remedies in the place
where the tort occurred or show the attempt to be futile, before
petitioning U.S. courts for relief under the ATS. There is no indication
that such an attempt was made in Nigeria by the Wiwa/Kiobel
plaintiffs.249
V. THE KIOBEL MAJORITY ERRED IN APPLYING THE LAW OF NATIONS
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that international law
must hold a corporation liable for a human rights violation before the
ATS will do so, the majority should have undertaken a thorough review
of corporate liability in international law. The majority rightly begins at
Nuremberg, where modern human rights law was born. But the majority
fails to consider some sources that ought to have been considered.
International fora have imposed civil liability against corporate actors for
aiding and abetting human rights atrocities. The preeminent and
precedent-setting example of this practice comes from I.G. Farben. In
this regard, Kiobel exercised an unforgivable lack of imagination when
consulting sources of international law.
A. Civil Litigation Against I.G. Farben Establishes an International
Norm of Corporate Liability
The Kiobel majority found that international law supported liability
for individuals, but not corporations, in the trial of I.G. Farben executives
(but not Farben itself) in the wake of World War II.250 Although the
Farben trial was carried out by an American Military Tribunal, both the
Second Circuit and the Supreme Court have treated the Nuremberg trials
as “international tribunals.”251 The decisions of these tribunals, along
with decisions of the International Court of Justice, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, are accorded great weight.
The majority felt it was decisive that there was no criminal liability
for Farben in 1948, and no liability for corporations in international
247

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117 (noting issues the majority did not reach in Kiobel).
Contra Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 625 F.3d 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
249 Posner, not surprisingly, disagrees with the exhaustion requirement: “[I]magine
having been required to file suit in a court in Nazi Germany complaining about genocide,
before being able to sue under the Alien Tort Statute.” Flomo v. Firestone Natural
Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011).
250 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 121.
251 Id. at 132.
248

2011] CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TORTS

85

criminal courts thereafter. The minority contested this point on logical
grounds: a lack of criminal liability in the 1940s should not logically
imply a lack of civil liability for present-day corporate malfeasance.252
The majority shot back that “the customary international law of human
rights does not impose any form of liability on corporations (civil,
criminal, or otherwise).”253
However, liability was imposed on I.G. Farben. After the war, the
Allies concluded that Farben could not continue to exist in its current
form. Allied forces ordered the company to wind up business, instituted
a “decartelization,” and broke the company into smaller units.254 This
“corporate capital punishment” was entirely appropriate, and it was
carried out under the auspices of the same Allied coalition that
established the war crimes tribunals at Nuremberg and individual
liability for crimes committed during wartime. This point was picked up
by both the Seventh Circuit and D.C. Circuit, which cite several laws of
the Allied Control Council.255 In 1945, “[l]egally, the corporation was
under Allied control and was managed and represented to the outside
world by the Tri-partite I.G. Farben Control Group (TRIFCOG).”256
The documents surrounding the dissolution of Farben are
intriguing. The goal of this corporate division did not appear to be an
appropriation of assets as prizes of war. Rather, the company breakup
was seen to be a just solution: nothing bearing Farben’s name could ever
be allowed to profit again. It effectively refutes the majority’s contention
that the law of nations has never imposed any form of liability on a
corporation.
Yet another indicator of the majority’s myopia was a failure to
mention Farben’s liability for the torts it committed against individuals.
Although Farben continued to exist “in liquidation” until 2003, it was
beset by claims from those it had enslaved during the war.
252

Id. at 147.
Id.
254 Allied High Commission (AHC) Law 35, “Dispersal of the Assets of I.G.
Farbenindustrie AG,” (August 1950), ordered the liquidation of the corporation and
separated its three main subsidiaries: BASF (a founding member of Farben in 1921, now
the largest chemical company in the world), Bayer, and Hoechst.
255
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d at1013, 1016, and Doe v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 31, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2011), (both citing, inter alia, Control
Council Law No. 9, “Providing for the Seizure of Property Owned by I.G.
Farbenindustrie and the Control Thereof,” Nov. 30, 1945, reprinted in 1 ENACTMENTS
AND APPROVED PAPERS OF THE CONTROL COUNCIL AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE 225
(1945)).
256
Joachim Rumpf, Norbert Wollheim’s Lawsuit Against I.G. Farbenindustrie AG
i.L.
at
5
(2010),
available
at
http://www.wollheimmemorial.de/files/1059/original/pdf_Joachim_Rumpf_Norbert_Wollheims_Lawsuit_agai
nst_IG_Farbenindustrie_AG_iL.pdf.
253
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A young man named Norbert Wollheim had been deemed “fit for
work” on the ramp at Auschwitz in early 1943. He was transferred to
Buna camp, where he was forced to work under constant threat of death
from SS guards until the arrival of Stalin’s troops in 1945. In 1950,
living in Lübeck after the war, Wollheim heard of the liquidation, asked
an attorney to look into the matter, brought the legal issue before
TRIFCOG, and was given permission to file a claim. “Permission for
institution of proceedings was required because German courts no longer
had jurisdiction over I.G. Farben following its sequestration in 1945.”257
TRIFCOG was an international body, and it indicated that a civil claim
could go forward against a corporate defendant.
Wollhiem filed his suit in Frankfurt am Regional Court, alleging
harms suffered during his forced labor, and demanding 10,000 Deutsche
Marks in compensation ($42,000 in 1951, roughly $365,000 in 2011).258
Farben was assigned an attorney, who argued that the SS, not Farben,
was responsible for Wollheim’s detention and maltreatment. Unable to
reach a settlement, Wollheim prepared for trial using many of the
materials compiled by prosecutors for Case 6 of the Nuremberg
Tribunals against the company’s executives. After eight days of
testimony from other laborers and Farben managers, the Frankfurt court
found for Wollheim, and explicitly held that the corporation breached an
affirmative duty to ensure humane treatment of its workers:
[F]rom the abovementioned statements of the witnesses for the
accused, the court infers an appalling indifference on the part of
the accused and its people to the plaintiff and the Jewish
prisoners, an indifference that is comprehensible only if one
assumes, with the plaintiff, that the defendant and its people at
that time really did not consider the plaintiff and the Jewish
prisoners to be full-fledged human beings, toward whom a duty
of care existed.259

Although this judgment was issued by a national court in Germany,
the Allied tribunal granted jurisdiction because the German court did not
have kompetenz-kompetenz for this dispute.260 This means that a
257

Id.
Id. at 6; Klageschrift [statement of claim], November 3, 1951. Hessisches
Hauptstaatsarchiv Wiesbaden (=HHStAW), Abt. 460, No. 1424 (Wollheim v. IG Farben),
vol.
I,
pp.
1–6,
available
at
http://www.wollheimmemorial.de/files/964/original/pdf_Anklageschrift_Wollheim-Prozess_3-11-1951.pdf.
259 Urteil im Wollheim-Prozess, June 10, 1953, p. 481 as translated in Rumpf, supra
note 256, at 10 (emphasis added).
260 This principle of law means the court did not have the power to determine its own
jurisdiction. In this respect, the German courts differ from the approach that U.S. federal
courts take to subject matter jurisdiction.
258
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precedent exists of an international tribunal granting personal and
subject-matter jurisdiction over a civil action for a tort committed in
violation of the law of nations by a juridical entity. Prima facie
violations of human rights (in this case, forced labor) were established.261
After jurisdiction was granted under international law, the case
proceeded according to the domestic law of Germany (a foreshadowing
of the district court’s patchwork solution in Filártiga). And importantly,
the court’s judgment was against Farben which now had international
legal personality.262 Wollheim’s claim has several points of similarity
with subsequent ATS actions against corporations, and it should have
direct bearing on whether the courts of the Second Circuit can hear the
case against Royal Dutch/Shell.
Wollheim’s victory inspired another suit by Rudolf Waschmann,
who was 17 when he was sent to Monowitz camp in 1943. He
performed forced labor for I.G. Farben until the war’s conclusion. He
then emigrated to the U.S., became a citizen in 1950, was drafted into the
military, and transferred to a post in Germany. As a U.S. service
member, he had recourse to file suit in a court established by the Allied
High Commission in Manheim—an actual international tribunal—that
followed American procedural law but used German substantive law.263
The case was quickly settled, but crucially, this occurred after
jurisdiction had been granted.264
The civil actions against Farben, far from showing an international
custom that precludes corporate liability, instead show that the
international community has: (1) set a relatively low bar for corporate
veil-piercing (there was relatively little discussion as to whether Farben’s
executives could be tried as war criminals for participation in Hitler’s
“Final Solution”); (2) established the ability to effectively impose a
“death sentence” of sorts—bankruptcy—against a corporation; and (3)
further allowed individual victims of human rights abuses to sue for the
individualized harms they suffered. Other post-Kiobel scholarship has
affirmed the implications of Farben’s liability for “regulating corporate
activity in conflict zones.”265
Judge Cabranes, writing that

261

Rumpf, supra note 256, at 8.
Id. at 9.
263 Id. at 15–18.
264 Id.
265 Tyler Giannini & Susan Farbstein, Corporate Accountability in Conflict Zones:
How Kiobel Undermines the Nuremberg Legacy and Modern Human Rights, 52 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 119, 123 (2010).
262
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“[international law] has never extended the scope of liability to a
corporation,”266 is incorrect.
B. Further Examples of Corporate Liability in International Law Missed
by Kiobel
Violations of international norms by corporate actors can result in a
foundation for liability under international law. For example, the ICJ
held that if the United States had effective control of Nicaraguan Contras
and their military operations, it could be vicariously liable for their
violations.267 Harold Koh points out several more violations of
international law for which corporations may incur liability:
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Tripartite
Declaration, for example, obliges corporations not to interfere
with employees’ rights to form unions and not to use child or
slave labor. Nuclear treaties, such as the Paris Convention,
and oil spill treaties hold shipowners and operators of nuclear
facilities liable for damage or loss of life to persons and
property from private nuclear accidents or oil spills.
Hazardous waste conventions, such as those concluded at
Basel, impose strict liability on corporate generators of
hazardous waste. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
effectively holds corporations liable for bribery.268

The majority addresses a few of these treaties, but discounts them
because they impose liability only in their specific fields.269 But set in a
broader context, such as Koh provides, one can see these treaties as part
of a clear trend in international law toward a greater assignment of
benefits and obligations for transnational corporations. Indeed, the
majority’s adherence to the view of law expressed by Justice Holmes
“confuses the existence of responsibility with the mode of implementing
it.”270 Steven Ratner goes on to argue that this “rich doctrine” leads to
the conclusion that “decision makers [ought to be able to] transpose the
primary rules of international human rights law and the secondary rules
of state and individual responsibility onto corporations.”

266 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d at 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010)
(emphasis in original).
267 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 64-65 (June
27); see also Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 499 (2001).
268 Koh, supra note 133, at 264–65 (internal citations omitted).
269
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 138.
270 Ratner, supra note 267, at 481.
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Kiobel should be decided with a view to its context: an increasingly
globalized world in which transnational corporations have (in many
cases) assumed more raw power than many sovereign States. “If
corporations are such significant actors in international relations and law,
then can they not assume the obligations currently placed on States or
individuals, based on those sets of rules of responsibility?271 Businesses
have a customary duty of care, especially when operating in areas
governed unscrupulously. Even if corporate entities are not yet liable for
the specific tort alleged in Kiobel, there is certainly no absence of
corporate liability in international law.
One of the most notable developers of this area of law, John
Ruggie, an advisor to the UN secretary-general,272 has proposed a threepillar framework for corporate human rights responsibility.273 Under this
framework, States have an obligation to protect their citizens against
human rights abuses, corporations and NGOs have a responsibility to
respect human rights, and victims must have access to effective judicial
or nonjudicial remedies.274 Ruggie recently published a draft of guiding
principles275 that, while currently constituting “soft law,” may in time
become customary and obligatory upon transnational corporations
everywhere. “Ruggie’s approach is appealing precisely because it
departs from the hierarchical rigidity embedded in demarcating
“subjects” and “objects” of international law. Ruggie’s delineation of
corporate responsibility is bottom-up, not top-down.”276 More and more,
we see corporations talking about “social responsibility” in addition to
their traditional responsibility to earn profits for shareholders.277
All the foregoing indicates that even if international law covers the
“gap” in the Alien Tort Statute, it may not be long before the Kiobel
majority could indeed point to an international custom that establishes a
principle of universal justice to regulate transnational entities.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Kiobel majority misinterpreted the Alien Tort Statute. An ATS
claim need not “arise under” international law or federal law. By the
terms of the statute, an action may be heard when an alien plaintiff
claims an injury caused by a jus cogens violation and committed by a
defendant who is subject to personal jurisdiction in a U.S. court. Some
jus cogens violations require State action as an element of the offense.
But other egregious behavior, such as piracy or human trafficking, is
universally prohibited—this behavior will violate the law of nations
whether the actor is public, private, or corporate.
In 1991, Congress reauthorized the ATS, giving the 200-year-old
statute a new purpose: upholding international human rights law. The
modern Congress intended the ATS to provide a unique and powerful
means of vindicating human rights abuses that occurred overseas.
Congress understood that the application of the ATS to this purpose
might cause some friction in U.S. foreign relations but believed that such
tension was “a small price to pay” for justice of this magnitude. The
boundaries for possible ATS defendants are defined by the reach of
federal personal jurisdiction. Furthermore, since corporations can be
ATS plaintiffs, they cannot effectively argue that they should be barred
from being ATS defendants.
Neither the ATS, Sosa, nor any other federal law “requires” that
international law extend liability to a corporate entity before the ATS
will do so. The boundaries for possible ATS defendants are defined by
the reach of federal personal jurisdiction.
Furthermore, since
corporations can be ATS plaintiffs, they cannot effectively argue that
they should be barred from being ATS defendants.
“Corporate liability” is not a norm that needs to be found. The
requirement for a “violation” relates to conduct prohibited by jus cogens.
Thus, the ATS comprehends some actions that could never arise in an
international tribunal. The ATS does not incorporate, as the majority
claims, the personal jurisdiction of international tribunals into the
subject-matter jurisdiction requirements of the ATS. What’s more, the
majority’s result, as a matter of policy, allows potential tortfeasors to
escape liability simply because the wrongs were committed under the
auspices of a transnational corporation. It would be preferable for
potential tortfeasors to escape liability because a trier of fact finds that
they were not responsible for the alleged torts.
Even if the majority is correct in assuming that the silence of the
ATS regarding defendants indicates a gap to be filled by international
law principles, the majority was wrong to conclude that international law
has never extended liability to a corporation. Civil actions against I.G.
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Farben establish a precedent for ATS litigation. Farben’s dissolution—a
corporate death penalty—by the Allies cannot not be understood as
“spoils of war” or explained away by any other legal theory. The
dissolution of Farben was punitive justice for crimes against humanity
attributed to the corporate body as a whole.
Finally, even if the majority is correct that these precedents do not
establish a universally recognized custom subjecting transnational
corporations to human rights principles today, John Ruggie and others
are hard at work building international regimes that will bind them. As
Judge Edwards predicted, the clear “trend in international law is toward a
more expansive allocation of rights and obligations to entities other than
states.”278 What’s more, other courts may fill the void created by the
Kiobel majority. “Even if America drops the baton, another country may
well pick it up.”279
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